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Introduction
American environmental literature claims that global sustainability and the ethic
of earthly care are humanist issues. From the early examples of Henry David Thoreau
and John Muir, we see classic environmental authors urging humanity to reconnect with
nature. More recently, however, environmental literature has received a post-humanist
makeover partly through its integration with feminism. Born of the last thirty years,
ecofeminist literature combines the environmentalist focus on reconnection with nature
with the feminist focus on gender equality. This combination produces a feminist view
on environmentalism that is concerned with the degradation of both earth and its peoples.
Ecofeminism foregoes a back-to-nature approach and instead incites a wake-up
call to humanity. Ecofeminist writers insist that there lies an inherent “connection
between the subjugation of women (or a group of people) and the domination of nature”
(Warren x). If we solve one issue, we can solve the other; this goal has become the
ecofeminists’ ultimate pursuit. Through handling topics such as gender, power, sexuality,
and nature, ecofeminist fiction develops narratives that expose our wrong turns and poor
decisions concerning the development of our societies and our treatment of both land and
people. Ursula K. Le Guin and Margaret Atwood are two fiction writers who have
produced important ecofeminist discussion through their novels. By analyzing Ursula K.
Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness (1969) and The Dispossessed (1974) as well as
Margaret Atwood’s Surfacing (1972) and Oryx and Crake (2003), this thesis shows how
these authors both contributed to the growth of ecofeminism and how their works remain
an important part of the ecofeminist dialogue.
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There are nearly as many theories about the beginnings of North American
ecofeminism as there are books on the subject. But most ecofeminist writers agree that
American ecofeminism in the early 1970s was a response to the threat of nuclear
annihilation and the damaging effects of war. At this time, the United States was
engaged in both the Vietnam and Cold Wars. Believing that militarization and nuclear
warfare were major contributors to the domination and maldevelopment facing the
western world, activists in the environmental and feminist communities gathered at
nuclear test sites in protest.
Environmental activists at these protests argued that the harmful chemicals, toxic
waste, and deadly intent of nuclear weapons made them the largest current threat to the
earth’s ability to sustain life. On down the fence, feminist activists rallied for the future
of their children and against the androcentric destruction. Ecofeminist author Noel
Sturgeon, who was present at the Nevada nuclear protests in 1970, writes that these
nuclear test sites were the meeting grounds for many like-minded activists looking to
secure a more peaceful future. She explains that “[i]n this political context, ‘the
environment’ served feminists as a medium for the connection of critiques of militarism,
capitalism, and neocolonialism” (145). Converging causes like these resulted in a
network of support and information for both activist groups. Those in this network soon
called themselves ecofeminists.
From the start, ecofeminists were animal rights activists, vegetarians, war
protesters, civil rights activists, feminists, ecologists and mothers of soldiers, all seeking
to end dominance and destruction. From these common goals grew a shared ethic of care
and a joint effort against the logic of domination. These goals became rhetorical staples
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in the ecofeminist movement. According to Deane Curtin, the ethic of care is a synthesis
of environmental ethics and feminist maternalism. It refers to an ethical model that
suggests “the interests of others should come before my own,” the manifestation of which
requires “empathetic projection into another’s life” (71). The ability to view the
degradation of the environment and the abuse of subcultures as inherently linked and as a
priority issue in one’s own life is the basis for the ethic of care in ecofeminism.
Along with urging humanity to make public matters personal, ecofeminists take
special care in criticizing and deconstructing the logic of domination. According to
ecofeminist philosopher Karen J. Warren, the logic of domination is the logic of the
traditional hierarchy which positions men and culture at the top, based on the assumption
of strength, and women and nature at the bottom, based on the corresponding assumption
of weakness. Ecofeminists address the culture/nature dialectic that empowers the logic of
domination in different ways. While some ecofeminists find the woman/nature identity
liberating, others find it confining. This split in the fabric of ecofeminism has spawned
criticism about the philosophy’s validity and utility, which I will soon address more
thoroughly.
For ecofeminists, the ethic of care is an obvious bridge between environmentalism
and feminism. The logic of domination, specifically, has resulted in unifying rhetoric
from feminists seeking to make environmentalism an integral part of feminism. To this
end, ecofeminists argue that “an environmentalist perspective is theoretically necessary
to feminism” (Sturgeon 190). This argument posits that since feminism upholds the ethic
of care and seeks to subvert the logic of domination, all feminists are thereby
ecofeminists and contemporary feminism should work to incorporate environmentalism
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into its philosophy. This sequence of philosophical convergence, synthesis, and adoption
is the foundation of ecofeminist thought.
The environmental feminist discussion of the 1970s was originally called “the
nature question” by cultural and radical feminists (Sandilands 6). As a term,
ecofeminism was introduced in 1974 by French feminist Francoise d’Eaubonne, who
wrote that “this new global movement of feminists draws upon the ‘specifically feminine’
power to combat the ecological crisis and the systems of male dominance that have given
rise to it” (MacGregor 20). D’Eaubonne’s term eco-feminsime came to America notably
by way of Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron’s translated New French Feminisms
(Gaard and Murphy 8). Eco-feminisme in the context of French feminism of the 1970s
refers specifically to the biological role of women, as mothers who produce future
generations, in a potential ecological revolution (Warren 19). While d’Eaubonne’s
specific goals do not correspond with “the nature question” of 1970s American feminists,
those American ecological feminist authors and activists at the time found this term
useful for describing their own movement.
What we now call ecofeminism is the resulting collaboration of various aspects of
both feminism and environmentalism. Both philosophies developed their own divisions
and subgroups which found their way into the ecofeminist discussion. According to
philosopher Allison Jaggar, there are four different categories within feminism, all of
which have influenced contemporary ecofeminism (Low and Tremayne 4). They are
liberal, radical/cultural, social and Marxist feminism. In an explanation simplified for
application to ecofeminism, liberal feminism focuses on civil rights issues; radical or
cultural feminism promotes a pushing away from androcentric conventions and accepts
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the association of women and nature as liberating; and social and Marxist feminism focus
on social constructions of power and economic and legal domination.
Many accounts of ecofeminism’s beginnings assert that “ecofeminism grew out of
radical, or cultural, feminism … which holds that identifying the dynamics—largely fear
and resentment—behind the dominance of male over female is the key to comprehending
every expression of patriarchal culture” (Spretnak 5). Certainly this thinking was fodder
for early ecofeminism, but most ecofeminist authors also recognize the analysis of
oppressive superstructures that comes from Marxist and social feminism, and the fight on
behalf of subjugated groups that comes from liberal feminism. The divisions of feminism
are intertwined, building off each other and using similar rhetoric. Therefore, for the
purposes of a literary analysis of ecofeminism, it is more important to recognize what
ecofeminism’s various influences are rather than decipher which came first.
The environmentalist movement also has several divisions. They are early
environmentalism, ecology, and deep ecology. Environmentalism is the older
environmental ethics movement associated with the literature of Thoreau and Muir. It
remains rational, scientific and concerned with preservation and human connection with
nature. Ecology developed as a holistic approach to environmental ethics. It values the
connectivity between nature and humanity. Ecology critiques Western culture which
“centers on its anthropocentrism, and the placing of humans in the superior position over
elements of nature” (Low and Tremayne 4). Ecopolitical author Sherilyn MacGregor
asserts that one of the main links between feminism and ecology is “women’s
dissatisfaction with the environmental movement, in which male domination was a
source of frustration” (25). Feminists and ecologists seeking a more holistic approach to
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the ethic of care found solace in the ecofeminist movement. Norwegian philosopher
Arne Naess first introduced and developed the concept of ‘Deep Ecology’ which “takes
into account distant future generations, the Third World, nonhuman species and, at times,
the biosphere as a whole” (Attfield 2). Deep ecology is largely concerned with long-term
environmental implications such as over-population and the damaging effects of species
extinction. Like cultural feminism, ecology is the division most accredited with the
development of ecofeminism. Since ecology is very much defined by its differences
from environmentalism and deep ecology, and since the ecofeminist discussion has run
the gamut from “back to nature” to overpopulation, familiarity with all three divisions is
necessary for an in-depth understanding of ecofeminism.
Composed of fragmented philosophies, ecofeminism has several different
positions within itself. Each position describes a unique approach to ecofeminism and
each provides a specific use in ecofeminist analysis. Irene Diamond and Gloria Feman
Orenstein give a particularly straight-forward explanation of the three ecofeminist
positions in Reweaving the World. The first position views the earth as having intrinsic
value. According to this position, the goal of ecofeminism is to restore and preserve
earth’s wholeness. This view that “the Earth is sacred unto itself” has brought about
several different faith-based movements surrounding the Gaia/goddess pagan traditions
(xi). The worship of nature is a reoccurring theme in ecofeminist literature, most notably
including fiction and essays by ecofeminist Pagan activist Starhawk. This position has
also aided the ecofeminist rhetoric in elevating nature toward spirituality.
The second position holds that “because human life is dependant on the Earth, our
fates are intertwined” (Diamond and Orenstein xii). For many ecofeminist philosophers,
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this position holds the trump card. They reason that destruction of the earth means
destruction of humanity and thus, for our own sake, we must care for the earth. Although
this is the least altruistic position, and requires the least amount of empathy described by
Warren as essential to the definition of ecofeminism, it holds a great deal of persuasive
power. Perhaps that is its purpose. Certainly, another use for this position is that it turns
the ethic of care to an issue of social justice which “cannot be achieved apart from the
well-being of Earth” (xii). Rhetorically, this position speaks to human guilt and selfpreservation because it persuades us that our well-being is tied to the earth’s well-being.
Finally, a third position takes the perspective of indigenous peoples. These
ecofeminists receive their identity from their environment. They may be indigenous to a
particular land, such as Native Americans or tribal people in Africa who have
identification with land ingrained in their cultures, or they may be people who have
consciously strived to relearn their identity as part of nature. Contemporary ecofeminists
of the 1990s, which includes the “Southern Ecofeminists” of Africa and Asia, use the
rhetoric of this position to analyze human relationships with technology, deforestation,
and developing economies.
One final philosophical division helps explain the growth of ecofeminism from
the 1970s to present day. The feminist debate over essentialism is such a large part of
ecofeminist discussion that it has become a defining factor of contemporary ecofeminism.
In ecofeminist philosophy, essentialism refers to the culture/nature divide wherein the
traditional hierarchy associates men with culture and women with nature. While this kind
of essentialism describes the logic of domination, women of the 1970s attempted to
reclaim this association and use it as a point of social power.

Messer 8
In the early days of ecofeminism, women felt disenfranchised from the
environmentalist movements due to androcentric, or “male-centered,” rhetoric and the
male-dominated culture of science. MacGregor writes that “[a]s problems within these
movements emerged it became necessary for women to assert their differences from men
in order to achieve their political goals. Among the strategies chosen for the task was the
deployment of maternalist rhetoric” (MacGregor 25). This strain of ecofeminist thought
supports the idea that women are more in tuned with nature than men and therefore have
a special role in the environmental movement. These women were able to break free of
unsatisfactory movements and create their own. The ecofeminist mantra for essentialism
is that there is a link between the domination of women and nature.
Those who find this kind of reductionism confining argue that essentializing
women as mothers, or as more attuned with nature, is a dangerous use of the same
rhetoric that feminism has long fought against. Anti-essentialist ecofeminists point to the
long struggle of women to break free from the confining roles of mother and wife. In
particular these ecofeminists fear the creation of “a new version of biological
determinism that privileges women’s relationship to nonhuman nature” (Lahar 11). Since
the tradition of domination relies on determinism to socially stratify men and women,
anti-essentialists assert that adopting essentialist rhetoric places women back in
women/nature trap where gender differences justify subjugation. Anti-essentialists
choose the ecofeminist position that there is an inherent link between subjugated people
and nature. Anti-essentialists reason that ecofeminism should be useful for analyzing all
types of domination, not just the domination of women.
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Speculative literature has an important role in the development of ecofeminism.
Although some influential ecofeminist literature was written before d’Eaubonne coined
eco-feminisme in 1974, the development of ecofeminist literary criticism is relatively
recent. Gretta Gaard and Patrick Murphy write that it was not until the 1990s that critics
were “beginning to make the insights of ecofeminism a component of literary criticism,”
and “discovering a wide array of environmental literature by women being written at the
same time as ecofeminist philosophy and criticism is being developed” (5). Murphy has
based his research in ecofeminist literary criticism on “Ursula K. LeGuin’s famous 1986
statement, ‘Where I live as a woman is to men a wilderness. But to me it is home’” (8).
Murphy views this statement as a critical turning point in ecofeminist fiction and focuses
his studies on the ways in which literature helped develop the philosophy. Unlike
Murphy’s research, which focuses on ecofeminist literature after 1986, this thesis focuses
on an earlier, precocious ecofeminist literature that helped conceptualize ecofeminism
from its roots.
In particular, this thesis examines the conceptualization of ecofeminism in the
speculative fiction of Ursula K. Le Guin and Margaret Atwood. Speculative fiction is
especially fertile ground for ecofeminism because of its idea-driven plots and its tradition
of utopias. Ecofeminist speculative literature contrasts our current society with utopic
ecofeminist visions, or else, hyperbolic anti-ecofeminist dystopias with idyllic
ecofeminist utopias. Calthleen McGuire and Colleen McGuire that “[w]e regard
ecofeminists as pragmatic visionaries and feel it is our business to ‘activate utopia’”
(186). These idyllic utopias activate ecofeminism by creating alternative cultures that
have made ecofeminist choices in their relationships with nature and each other.
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Dystopias contribute by exaggerating maldevelopments in our society so that these
cultural decisions are obvious social failures deserving of reform. Dystopias also warn us,
if hyperbolically, that the same kind of oppression and chaos, which many of them depict,
loom as a possible fate for humanity.
Ecofeminist speculative fiction has several themes that help identify ecofeminist
literature and contribute to its philosophical growth. For the purposes of analyzing the
works of Le Guin and Atwood, the relevant subjects are ahistory, gender, androgyny,
otherization, technology, and development. First, ahistory is a topic that has many names
and implications. Ahistory as a term refers to the solution to the problem of androcentric
history. Speculative fiction dealing with ahistory tends to describe the creation of new
cultures that deviate from older ones, the dawn after the apocalypse, new generations of
humans, and other motifs of renewal. Ahistory specifically attacks the maldevelopment
and tradition of domination in traditional androcentric history.
In fiction, gender and androgyny themes often play out in ways that undermine
gender stereotypes, downplaying the practical importance of gender differences.
Speculative gender bending also helps prepare readers for other such earth-shattering
assertions made through these speculative cultures. It forces readers to unlearn
traditional gender for the duration of the reading lending to an overall openness to
unfamiliar ideas.
Otherization as a theme is literary criticism’s way of addressing anti-essentialism.
Characters who feel isolated, confined, or “otherized” due to social duties or roles are
expressing anti-essentialist sentiment. “The other” is a feminist concept which aims “to
reject the notion of absolute difference and the binary construction of inside and outside”
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(Sturgeon 5). Ecofeminist fiction often illustrates how insistence on binaries is
dangerous and inaccurate, similar to the anti-essentialist’s rebuke of the culture/nature
dialectic.
Technology is an increasingly important topic in contemporary ecofeminist
literature. In speculative ecofeminist fiction, the focus on technology has shifted from its
antagonistic effects on nature to its influence on human cultural development. McGuire
and McGuire explain that this shift is useful for identifying stages of ecofeminist literary
development. They write, “it is in the nexus between nature and technology that the
authors most starkly demarcate the differences between seventies radical feminism and
ecofeminism” (196). Later chapters discuss such differences are discussed in Atwood’s
early and recent ecofeminist novels.
Along with Le Guin and Atwood, there were several authors publishing in the
1960s and 1970s who are very influential on the style and rhetoric of the ecofeminist
literary genre. Authors Rachel Carson, Earnest Callenbach, and Marge Peircy provide a
helpful timeline for contextualizing ecofeminism’s literary roots. Although not a fiction
writer, Carson’s work is certainly part of the nascent ecofeminist literary movement. She
wrote before the emergence of ecofeminism and her works do not handle typical feminist
issues of gender equality, birth control, and disparate pay, but many ecofeminist scholars
still either mention her work or give her honorary status as a “recovered” ecofeminist
author (Murphy 45). Significantly, Carson wrote Silent Spring (1962) which changed the
way Americans used pesticides and influenced governmental policy concerning the use
of DEET, a highly toxic chemical found in popular pesticides.
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Silent Spring also draws a narrative picture of the connectivity between humanity
and the environment. Carson traced the decline in the American bird and fish population
back to DEET and the companies and politicians who supported it. She writes “[f]or each
of us, as for the robin in Michigan or the salmon in the Miramichi, this is a problem of
ecology, of interrelationships, of interdependence” (189). Precociously, Carson invokes
the rhetoric of the ecofeminist position that views human fate as intertwined with the
earth’s. Of our relationships with birds, fish, nature and each other, Carson writes “[t]hey
reflect the web of life—or death—that scientists know as ecology” (189). Carson, a
woman writing a controversial, scientific exposé of a chemical backed by corporations
and politics, paved the way for women’s involvement in ecology and the literature that
followed.
Earnest Callenbach also deserves to be mentioned although he is not an
ecofeminist author, or even a “recovered author” for that matter. He made his mark on
ecological utopian literature with Ecotopia: The Notebooks and Reports of William
Weston published in 1975. This short novel is the diary of protagonist William Weston’s
investigation of Ecotopia, a country that seceded from America and covers the territory of
the American northwest. Weston reports on innovations of transportation technology,
energy sources, gender relations, communal living and other such flavors of the utopian
stock. Callenbach’s technique of contrasting Ecotopia’s plausible innovations and ideas
with Weston’s exaggeratedly prudish commentary creates a generous critique on
American (and Western) society. This technique of exaggerated contrast has become
standard in the ecofeminist utopian genre.
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Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time (1976) is mentioned in nearly every
book on ecofeminist literature. This is likely due to the consensus as noted in one such
book that “[t]he most influential of ecofeminism’s roots was the radical feminism of the
seventies … as personified in Woman on the Edge of Time” (McGuire and McGuire 196).
Piercy’s protagonist channels two worlds, an ecofeminist utopia and a horrifying dystopia.
A differentiating factor between the two worlds is their relationships with technology.
The utopian vision embodies the 1960s and 1970s feminist hopes of using technology to
further liberate women in the same way that the technology of the birth control pill is
credited with jumpstarting the women’s liberation movement. In the dystopic vision,
humans use technology for oppressive and unnatural organ harvesting projects. Woman
on the Edge of Time set the trend for the ecofeminist literary treatment of technology.
This discussion continues to warn that we cannot embrace technology without
recognizing its danger.
Carson, Callenbach, and Piercy show the emergence of feminism literature from
its earliest inklings in Carson’s research and Callenbach’s standard utopian techniques to
its literary speculative form with Piercy. Before Woman on the Edge of Time made its
1976 debut, Ursula K. Le Guin and Margaret Atwood’s early works helped set the stage
for ecofeminist literature and philosophy. Both authors contributed significantly by
conceptualizing ecofeminist themes and expanding on ideas of power relationships. Due
to d’Eaubonne’s eco-feminisme coined in 1974 (which did not find its way into America
until later) and Marge Peircy’s novel in 1976, some scholars are tempted to assert that
ecofeminism began in the mid or late 1970s. However, because no movement or
philosophy can spontaneously appear fully formed, it is important to analyze those
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authors such as Le Guin and Atwood who had significant influence on the ecofeminism’s
incubation period. An ecofeminist analysis of Le Guin and Atwood’s novels provides
profound insight into where the movement is coming from and where it has gone.
Le Guin is a long celebrated author of science and speculative fiction. She has
won the Hugo, Nebula, World Fantasy, and National Book Awards for books she steels
with hard hitting social critiques particularly in the realm of gender and power dynamics.
But most literary criticism that discusses Le Guin’s ecofeminism focuses on her writing
after 1976. As previously noted, Patrick D. Murphy has produced a good deal of research
and criticism using Le Guin’s wilderness quotation as a departure point for contemporary
ecofeminist studies. Murphy writes that “The novel that balances and integrates ecology
and feminism more evenly and successfully than any other I have ever read is Ursula K.
Le Guin’s Always Coming Home (1985)” (238). This tends to be the kind of reception
her 1980s work receives from contemporary ecofeminist analyses. However, few
ecofeminist scholars extend their research to Le Guin’s earlier novels, The Left Hand of
Darkness (1969) and The Dispossessed (1974). As this thesis later discusses, both novels
contain critical ecofeminist ideas and provide necessary context for the beginnings of
ecofeminism in speculative fiction.
Le Guin uniquely executes her commentary on these themes through experiments
with subjectivity. Her readers must expand their ideas of identity in order to relate to her
stories. Protagonists Genly Ai and Shevek, of The Left Hand of Darkness and The
Dispossessed respectively, are both displaced characters whose survival depends on their
success in integrating with new worlds while retaining their identities. The result is a
flexible, borderless understanding of the self. This is one of the ways that Le Guin fights
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against the essentialist traps of early ecofeminist writing; she “rejects the possibility that
dualism may be resolved by returning to an original state of unity” (Armbruster 114). Le
Guin’s refusal to let her characters arrive at one convenient identity becomes a standard
strategy in the anti-essentialist discourse as well as for the otherization themes in
ecofeminist literature.
For the very reason that Le Guin was handling ecofeminist themes well before
1985, it is necessary to “recover” or bring both The Left Hand of Darkness and The
Dispossessed into the realm of ecofeminist literary analysis. In the introduction to The
Left Hand of Darkness, Le Guin writes “The science fiction writer is supposed to take a
trend or phenomenon of the here-and-now, purify and intensity it for dramatic effect, and
extend it into the future” (i). For Le Guin, this process typically includes gender-bending,
social revolution, environmental consciousness and a complete turning on end of selfidentity. Murphy writes that this method is important because “these stories are part of a
project to rethink human/nonhuman and self/other relationships” (Murphy 234). Thus is
the goal of ecofeminism and so it is of these two novels.
Margaret Atwood is an interesting match for an ecofeminist literary analysis
involving Le Guin. Both authors make the same arguments about essentialism, identity,
and human/nature connectivity, but they take noticeably different routes. Atwood tends
toward speculative fiction featuring alternate cultures and realities, rather than the science
fiction involving new races, species, and planets favored by Le Guin. Le Guin’s novels
focus on the dual dominations of nature and subgroups, while Atwood’s 1972 novel
Surfacing invokes slightly more overt feminist rhetoric centering her narrative on the
domination of nature and women. In Atwood’s 2003 novel Oryx and Crake she takes up
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the cause of dominated peoples as well, showing a progression of ecofeminist thought
with the changing social climate.
Atwood comes from a great tradition of environmental writers and, as a woman,
her work consistently discusses feminist themes. However, much of Atwood’s early
writing does not attempt to combine the ideas of feminism and environmentalism, but
instead treats them as two major, intersecting themes. The protagonists in both The
Edible Woman (1969) and Bodily Harm (1981), for instance, are females who “have
accepted the morës of the twentieth-century consumer society and lived according to
them, in many cases by directly serving that society” (Woodcock 15). The protagonists
struggle with their jobs, relationships, and choices. Alongside this struggle they also
witness abuse of the natural world. Surfacing is the exception. It uniquely connects the
oppression of women and nature when its female character becomes nature. Through this
perspective, Surfacing discusses pressing feminist and ecological issues and combines
them through the eyes of the morphing narrator.
Oryx and Crake provides a picture of Atwood’s ecofeminist growth thirty-one
years after Surfacing. Quite a lot has changed. Atwood’s protagonist is male, and her
themes reflect less of the women’s liberation sentiment of the 1970s and more of the
nature versus technology rhetoric of contemporary ecofeminism. Contemporary or
radical, Atwood’s literary perspective has always been especially valuable for its personal
and emotional reaction to all sorts of oppression. Atwood’s contribution to ecofeminist
literature has been her ability to show growth over a long and prolific period of writing
during which she empowered many ecofeminist arguments. This joint analysis of Le
Guin and Atwood examines the growth of the ecofeminist discussion from two of its
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earliest literary contributors, so that we who are currently invested in contemporary
ecofeminist studies may better understand its roots.
The first chapter analyzes Le Guin’s earlier novel, The Left Hand of Darkness. I
begin by examining the milieu of criticism discussing Le Guin’s use of gender and the
ways in which both the criticism and Le Guin have affected ecofeminist literature. In the
novel, Genly Ai travels to Gethen, a world where the humans are neither male nor female,
but rather they contain qualities of both genders. As I point out, the novel addresses with
a wealth of topics beyond gender. Two of those topics that correspond with ecofeminism
are ahistory and demilitarization. I examine Le Guin’s innovative use of time and
calendar to create a world without traditional history. The removal of androcentrism
from history is an important motif in ecofeminism, which asserts that history should not
be dominated by one culture’s perspective. Without androcentrism, the Gethenians have
yet to invent war. I also analyze the novel’s anti-militarization rhetoric and explore the
Gethenian’s maldevelopment toward gender, history, and war.
In the second chapter, I examine the logic by which Le Guin links environmental
sustainability and social equality as connected social movements in The Dispossessed.
Shevek travels between his home, an ecofeminist utopia, and the pre-revolutionary planet
in order to open communication between the two. Using this narrative, I examine Le
Guin’s treatment of dominance through the contrasting cultures’ positions on possession
and ownership. I also analyze how Le Guin uses the two societies’ reactions to these
dominance themes to justify or eradicate racism, classism, and sexism.
Departing from Le Guin, I focus on Atwood’s Surfacing in chapter three.
Because essentialism is such a large part of ecofeminist discourse, and because Surfacing
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covers the debate best of all the books in this analysis, I use this chapter to explain and
explore this broad topic. Atwood argues her anti-essentialist stance through otherization
and anti-maternalism. I explore the way that these themes have grown in ecofeminism
and how they are now at the heart of contemporary ecofeminism.
Finally, in chapter four, I discuss the ecofeminist perspectives on technology and
ahistory in Atwood’s Oryx and Crake. Because Oryx and Crake was written three
decades later than the previous three novels, this chapter also examines themes that have
been present in ecofeminism from its beginnings and point out how they have changed
with both ecofeminism and the political climate as well.
Ecofeminism has decried the logic of domination and encouraged a global ethic of
care from the Vietnam War to the Iraq War times. Some would say not much has
changed in the American political and social landscapes. Ecofeminism, which has only
existed within this time frame, speaks to the contrary. From the seeds of a common need
for social reform between feminist and ecological activism, ecofeminism has grown to
purport and inextricable relationship between social equality and environmentalism. The
following chapters seek to both further explain ecofeminist philosophy as well as chart its
growth through time and literature. The various themes found in the selected novels by
Le Guin and Atwood show how these authors continue to help conceptualize the goals of
ecofeminism. In doing so, these authors reveal truths about humanity and our
relationship with the earth that no amount of philosophical text alone could achieve alone.
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Chapter I
On the Brink
The Left Hand of Darkness has been heavily analyzed for its gender-bending
characters and scrutinized for Le Guin’s use of masculine pronouns describing
androgynous people, but criticism addressing other interesting aspects of the novel is
lacking. While Le Guin’s commentary on gender construction is thought provoking and
relevant to the radical feminist movement, it is important not to overlook the novel’s
other dimensions. The Left Hand of Darkness is an ecofeminist novel and as such its
thoroughly discussed gender criticism provides a window into Le Guin’s commentary on
domination and care. An androgynous world with no written history or war is certainly
fodder for an ecofeminist analysis. Therefore, by taking an ecofeminist look into Le
Guin’s androgynous world (including the criticism thereof), we can also glean the
formation of ecofeminist ideas on history, androcentrism, and militarization.
Because Le Guin wrote pre eco-feminisme, her ecofeminist themes are defined in
terms of what they are not instead of what they are. Experimenting with gender
constructs is central to the effectiveness of her commentary on other social constructs,
especially that of domination. This experimental approach continues to differentiate Le
Guin from other ecofeminist writers who have come after her. In a widely studied 1986
talk titled “Woman/Wilderness,” Le Guin asserts that all knowledge is based on
androcentric constructs, including our concepts of women and nature. She states,
The women are speaking … And what they say is: We are sacred …
Listen: they do not say, “nature is sacred.” Because they distrust that
word, Nature. Nature as not including humanity, Nature as what is not
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human, that Nature is a construct made by Man, not a real thing; just as
most of what Man says and knows about women is mere myth and
construct. Where I live as woman is to men a wilderness. But to me it is
home. (162)
Le Guin’s philosophy on domination begins with fear of the unknown. Androcentric
societies readily link men with culture and women with nature because the latter two are
outside of their frame of reference. Le Guin follows human fear of the unknown to its
logical end, which is that that what we fear we attempt to control. In
“Woman/Wilderness,” Le Guin reiterates the very foundation of ecofeminism: that
gender and nature are inextricably linked, and that the same logic of domination befalls
them both. This understanding of domination extends all the way back to her 1969 novel,
The Left Hand of Darkness.
The discussion of dominance in The Left Hand of Darkness begins with gender.
In arguing that Le Guin’s use of gender bending lies within the greater context of
ecofeminism, it is appropriate to begin by analyzing a few of the most common genderidentity readings of The Left Hand of Darkness. The first is that Le Guin’s ambitious
invention of Gethen as an androgynous utopia is undercut by her use of masculine
pronouns. As an unreliable narrator, Genly rationalizes his choice of using masculine
pronouns in his report with the simple logic that he had been doing it subconsciously all
along; no reason to stop now. He explains, “man I must say, having said he and his” (5).
Some critics believe that these are Le Guin’s reasons for not “inventing new words to
accurately depict her vision of the androgyne” (LeFanu 115). However, an ecofeminist
reading takes into account that this is Genly, the male protagonist, speaking—not Le
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Guin—and that Genly comes from an androcentric society. Le Guin creates an imperial
convoy so apparently male that the androgynous Gethenians have no other descriptor for
him than Pervert. The story is told through his truth and as he states “truth is a matter of
imagination” (1). As if to warn you can take the man out of Terra but you can’t take
Terra out of the man, Genly explains in the beginning, “if the facts seem to alter with an
altered voice, why then you just choose the facts you like best” (2). For many critics,
blaming The Left Hand of Darkness’s shortcomings, flaws and unexplained plot holes on
Genly’s inadequacy as an intercultural reporter is too convenient, but concluding that Le
Guin “could not conceive of Gethenian sexuality without first relegating her characters to
male/female roles,” is too obtuse (LeFanu 117). A reader who misses that Genly is a
flawed narrator literally interpreting an alien culture and language through his alwaysmasculine lens is a reader who misses the point.
Another frequent criticism of The Left Hand of Darkness is that Le Guin’s
treatment of characters, especially Estraven, denies that “androgyny can be seen as a
space of resistance that redefines the ways in which gender identity is constructed”
(Fayad 59). This vein of criticism focuses less on the idea that Le Guin does not employ
enough creativity in the creation of these androgynous characters. The complaint about
Estraven’s character is that he is composed of gendered pieces quilted together instead of
a completely new gender. Of Le Guin’s choice in characterizing Estraven, critic Mona
Fayad asks “can we move beyond androgyny as a mere merging of gender roles in a
polarization of traditional oppositions (passive/ active, emotional/rational, left/right)?”
(60). Critics in this line of thought feel that Le Guin did not utilize well-enough the
creative space afforded by both science fiction and androgyny.
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One instance wherein Estraven seems restrained by the male/female binary is his
first meeting with Genly. Upon meeting Estraven, Genly notes, “Even in a bisexual
society, the politician is very often something less than an integral man” (15). Estraven is
at once the authoritative Prime Minister of Karhide and damned by Genly for his
“effeminate deviousness” (14). Le Guin (or Genly) seems to fall into the trap of
associating Estraven’s powerful characteristics with masculinity and his passiveaggressive characteristics with femininity. Critics like Fayad argue that a genderless
world would not have these binary characteristics.
In answer to this critique, John Pennington suggests that “male and female
readers cannot escape their own genders” and that The Left Hand of Darkness demands
that “each reader must define his or her inner space where gender finds its own
ideological space; the novel requires readers to resist a gendered reading of the narrative”
(352). The pronoun critics reply that responsibility for flaws in the androgyny narrative
too conveniently shifts away from Le Guin; this time the reader takes the charge. It is
reasonable to make the author responsible for her work, but as Pennington asserts, “the
text asks that both male and female readers become resisting readers, who must identify
against their gendered selves and critique those stereotypes” (353). In the great tradition
of science fiction, authors and readers alike are challenged by the composition of
alternate realities. Perhaps Le Guin meant for readers to notice how unfitting masculine
pronouns were on androgynous people and to account for the same kind of pronoun
misuse in their own culture. Deconstructing gender through androgynous characters
allows for many other constructs to come under question. This is, of course, Le Guin’s
intent.
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While one set of critics notes that Le Guin’s “androgynous” characters default to
masculinity, and another scoff at the wasted creative freedom where androgyny is
concerned, a third set asserts that her use of power struggles undermines the utopia.
LeFanu praises the idea of an androgynous utopia for providing “a retreat from conflict, a
retreat from the symbolic order and the construction of the subject within language, back
to the pre-Oedipal imaginary order, or, as Frederic Jameson puts it, the ancient dream of
Freedom from sex,” but she disputes that Le Guin succeeds at creating this utopia (140).
Fayad furthers the critique arguing that “Instead of a search for balance and integration,
there is a struggle for dominance” (65). Those expecting Genly to stumble upon a true
utopia and report an experience similar to William Weston’s will be disappointed.
Particularly, this utopia falls apart as Genly becomes more sensitive to Gethenian
power struggles. Estraven’s indirect speech, the Gethenian value of saving face, and the
recognition of social position and authority all grow from the Gethenian norm of
shifgrethor which is, in itself, a power struggle. Shifgrethor performs as if the
participants are trying to lower a very heavy piece of furniture to the ground in concert
and each is overly careful not to disrupt the balance of weight (or power) so that they
neither receive more or less of the burden than the others. Shifgrethor, however, is a
superficial performance because underneath the appearance of equality exists an
underlying hierarchy of social position and authority. Fayad disagrees that the novel’s
“purpose is to eliminate the ‘struggle for dominance’ through assimilation, and hence, by
extension, through ‘denying difference,’” and suggests that the novel can be read as “a
parody of the patriarchal need for assimilation and sameness, one in which the male eye
is incapable of seeing anything other than what it wishes to construct” (65). This idea of
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the “male eye,” or masculine dominance, in The Left Hand of Darkness aligns with Le
Guin’s ecofeminist perspective. The power struggles in The Left Hand of Darkness
purposefully illustrate the destruction manifested by a logic of domination.
An ecofeminist reply to the novel’s gender criticism insists that Genly is a
masculine interpreter, the reader is responsible for making his/her own critiques on
gender construction, and that Gethen is an unraveling utopia wrought with power
struggles. But a pure gender-reading of power struggles within The Left Hand of
Darkness treats only one half of the novel’s whole commentary on dominance. This
assertion calls back to Le Guin’s remark about the androcentric society’s determination to
accept only what it constructs or controls. Remembering Le Guin’s words about
dominant culture defining this dark, wild “other” as woman and nature, these terms
become metaphors for all that is subject to an enduring dominant paradigm. With gender
analysis more than sufficiently discussed, it is important to investigate power structures
in the specific context of ecofeminism.
Along with subverting gender, The Left Hand of Darkness engages in several
other tenets now part of ecofeminism, namely ahistory, demilitarization, and the ethic of
care. The novel especially assumes ahistory as a key component of its ecofeminist utopia.
On the rejection of history, ecofeminist writer Stephanie Lahar explains that history,
dominated by androcentrism, justifies human “maldevelopment” in which humanity
begins to commodify people and nature (7). For these maldeveloped cultures,
ecofeminism prescribes ahistory, or the subversion of historical development that has led
to domination. Ecofeminism posits that departing from a maldeveloped history is an
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initial step toward subverting dominant power structures that have pursued the
subjugation, control, and abuse of nature and people.
One prominent example of ahistory in The Left Hand of Darkness is the
Gethenian calendar. On Gethen, the year is always One. Genly reports, “Only the dating
of every past and future year changes each New Year’s Day, as one counts backwards or
forwards from the unitary Now” (2). The Gethenian relationship with time is expressly
ecofeminist as they do not allow history to determine the present but instead change
history each year as dictated by the present. Clearly, the past cannot be eradicated.
Ahistory’s objective is to end cultural use of history as a moral compass with which the
tradition of dominance is transmitted through generations of people. Without history,
tradition cannot justify atrocity. Gender, for instance, is part of Genly’s socialization—
his history and culture—and his perspective is relentlessly skewed by the trap of gender.
As part of Le Guin’s thought experiment, departing from history and refuting gender are
different means to the same end. Ahistory, however, treats an entire scope of subjugation
including that of the environment instead of focusing solely on gender roles or the
subjugation of women.
In Noel Sturgeon’s account of the first ecofeminist Nevada nuclear protests, she
asserts that demilitarization was an impetus for merging environmentalism with feminism.
As a founding ecofeminist objective, anti-militarism is a tell-tale sign of an ecofeminist
utopia. Gethen fulfills this requirement because, as Genly clarifies, “I did not speak of
war for a good reason; there’s no word for it in Karhidish” (35). The states of Gethen do
not war with each other though they may not be especially friendly with each other either.
Genly eventually realizes that Gethenian pacifism is a ruse. He notes,
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Tibe evidently was going to press Karhide’s claim to that region: precisely
the kind of action which, on any other world at this stage of civilization
would lead to war. But on Gethen nothing led to war. Quarrels, murders,
feuds, forays, vendettas, assassinations, tortures and abominations, all
these were in their repertory of human accomplishments; but they did not
go to war. (48)
These alternatives to war are not ideal but the absence of war is essential to Gethenian
philosophy. Genly’s wry report of the war situation on Gethen criticizes the Gethenian’s
pretentiousness. Genly uses the past tense when he describes how the war situation “was”
on Gethen because on Genly’s first voyage Gethen had not yet militarized. This leads us
to believe that his future knowledge of Gethenian political relations involves the
innovation of war.
When Genly first arrives on Gethen it is an ecofeminist utopia that is just
beginning to maldevelop. Genly notices that anti-militarization on Gethen may have
more to do with convenience than with conscientious objection. Genly’s race also refers
to the planet Gethen as “Winter” because of the constant snow and cold weather. He
hypothesizes that the snow and winter landscape, which create difficult transportation
conditions year-round, has shaped the Gethenian people making them slow moving and
careful. Genly reasons the Gethenians lack war because “they lack, it seemed, the
capacity to mobilize” (49). Not only does the environment shape the Gethenian people
and not the other way around, but the environmental conditions also lead to
demilitarization. Christine Cornell suggests that as Genly forms these conclusions, he
“begins to see that there is no final distinction between personal and political” (324). The
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environment influences both the personal and political action on Gethen, which has yet to
conceive of war, signifying an ecofeminist utopia.
While ahistory and demilitarization promote departure from the dominant
tradition, the ethic of care encourages the creation of a more conscious human culture.
This tenet of ecofeminism promotes a caring relationship between humans and the
environment. One such relationship that exists within on Gethen is the landscape’s
impact on the Gethenian’s vegetarian diet. On vegetarianism, Curtin argues, “The
injunction to care…should be understood to include the injunction to eliminate suffering
whenever possible” and notes that “in the case of killing animals for human consumption
where there is choice, this practice inflicts pain that is completely unnecessary and
avoidable” (76). The Gethenians have little choice in food because the wintry landscape
makes farming difficult and much of the land unworkable. Even still, the Gethenians are
vegetarian. Genly reports rather dismally that “there are no large meat-animals on Winter,
and no mammalian products, milk, butter or cheese; the only high-protein, highcarbohydrate foods are the various kinds of eggs, fish, nuts and the Hainish grains” (10).
Despite the harsh conditions of this planet, the Gethenians work with their land to farm as
best they can, eating fish and eggs only when necessary. Although the Gethenian society
has technological capabilities, Gethenian cars are all electric and slow moving. When
there is much snow, there is little or no mobility. Genly notices that unlike back home on
Terra, the Gethenians have never thought to mine or raid their planet for fossil fuels nor
have they ever conceived of genetically altering their food for preservation. In
relationship to the land, the disparity between Genly’s home planet and Gethen is this
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ethic of care, the consciousness and cultural decision to abstain from unnecessary
destruction or suffering.
In 1978, Le Guin spoke at a Planned Parenthood symposium on the topic of
“Moral and Ethical Implications of Family Planning.” The insight she offers is this: “The
survival of our species and of all higher forms of life on the planet now depends primarily
and, as I understand it, very urgently on the limitation of the human population” (18). In
The Left Hand of Darkness, Le Guin reiterates that the human population exacerbates the
destruction of both human and non-human life. Gethen is not perfect and is becoming
less so all the time. However, Le Guin stresses that its utopian aspects develop from
limitations on the Gethenian destruction of land and people. The ecofeminist utopia she
creates on Gethen illustrates the development of a human culture that has made many
ethical decisions regarding the environment but that has begun to maldevelop in the
treatment of its people. Ecofeminism maintains that the relationship between the
dominant group and the environment and the relationship between the dominant group
and its people are one and the same; when one relationship goes awry, so will the other.
For Gethenians, this means that once they create war, the destruction of their
environment will follow.
Gethen, then, is an allegoric semi-utopia, bridging many facets of feminism and
environmentalism but is still far from ideal. In her essay “Ecofeminist Theory and
Grassroots Politics,” Stephanie Lahar appreciates the enormity of the ecofeminist
challenge. She notes, “Ecofeminism makes such big promises! The convergence of
ecology and feminism in to a new social theory and political movement challenges
gender relations, social institutions, economic systems, science, and views of our place as
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humans in the biosphere” (1). The Left Hand of Darkness sheds light on each of these
topics and warns that the delicate balance of humanity’s relationship with the
environment relies on human consciousness.
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Chapter II
Revolution into Being
In the five years between The Left Hand of Darkness (1969) and The
Dispossessed (1974), cultural feminists continued to combine environmental ethics with
feminist issues of social equality. By 1974, anti-militarist sentiments were beginning to
peak in the American public as the Vietnam War approval rating approached an all-time
low. Reflecting the quickening momentum of these social currents, Ursula K. Le Guin
creates another unraveling utopia with The Dispossessed. This novel upholds the same
principles of gender, demilitarization, and sustainable living as The Left Hand of
Darkness, but this time it emphasizes human nature as the impetus for social
maldevelopment. The Dispossessed is the story of two worlds of dueling ideas and
lifestyles. However, rather than contrasting a utopia and dystopia, a formula familiar to
the science fiction genre, Le Guin refutes the idea of true utopia. The novel shows that
the human habits of ownership, excess, and domination can at best lead to “an ambiguous
utopia.”
The Dispossessed reveals a growth and balance in Le Guin’s ecofeminist writing
as well as illustrates ecofeminism’s emergence as its own philosophy instead of two
separate but complimentary movements. By telling the story of an ecofeminist utopia
gone complacent, Le Guin illustrates that sustainability requires constant revolution
against those characteristics of the human race that tend toward possession, domination,
and waste. While reinforcing the idea that environmentalism and feminism are
inextricably linked, Le Guin composes two contrasting social worlds whose tragic flaw is
humanity.
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The Dispossessed follows Shevek, a physicist, whose scientific ambitions prompt
him to open travel between Annares and Urras for the first time in over two hundred
years. Le Guin’s ecofeminist commentary arises from Shevek’s account of the contrast
between Annares’ cooperative anarchy and Urras’ patriarchal autocracy. Shevek’s home,
Annares, is the moon of the planet Urras and hosts an experimental, revolutionary society
of Odonians. The Odonians’ fabled leader Odo united the labor class on Urras with her
anarchist writings, and led a revolution which resulted in a mass exodus to the moon,
where the Odonians work and live according her teachings. Like on Gethen, much of the
Annaresti utopia is superficial but began with good intentions. Shevek realizes that many
of the Urrasti maldevelopments such as ownership, classism, and waste are beginning to
emerge on Annares. Le Guin argues that these maldevelopments grow from the logic of
domination, which is inherent in human nature. For Le Guin, wherever humans are
present, there can be no utopia.
Domination is a major theme in the novel involving motifs of property, ownership,
language, and identity. Through Le Guin’s insistence that dominance is part of human
nature, humans on both worlds come to identify themselves by what they own and what
they control. The Dispossessed derives its title from the concept of property. It is a title
that summons visions of the ideal Odonian society—one without property or ego.
Because the Odonians boycotted ownership they derisively refer to the Urrasti as
“propertarians.” When Shevek first discusses women with a group of Urrasti men, they
are appalled to learn that the Odonian society practices gender equality. Shevek
determines that their disgust also carries animosity but decides that “[h]e had no right to
tease them,” for “[t]hey knew no relation but possession. They were possessed” (75).
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However, Shevek becomes the real subject of this novel’s title when he loses citizenship
on Annares and is received as an outsider on Urras. Once he truly has nothing, he begins
to fully understand Odonianism and the importance of revolution. Le Guin emphasizes
that we do not recognize the destructive quality of dominance until we are affected by it.
Le Guin illustrates that dominance is instinctual and that humans must
systematically unlearn it in order to achieve equality. On Annares, there is no concept of
property or money. All necessities are shared and administered by the Production and
Distribution Coordination (PDC), which is the institution most closely resembling a
formal government. Shevek later describes the PDC to the Urrasti as “a coordinating
system for all syndicates, federatives, and individuals who do productive work. They do
not govern persons; they administer production” (76). Susan Storing Benfield notes that
“Le Guin provides a vivid picture of those aspects of human nature that create hierarchies
and bureaucracies even in the absence of formal government” (128). When Shevek is an
infant, he has an altercation with another child who wants to sit where he is sitting.
Shevek protests and shouts “Mine!” The caretaker explains to him, “It’s not yours …
Nothing is yours. It is to use” (27). Le Guin takes great care to communicate that there
is no need for corruption on Annares because there is no money, property and no formal
power. The PDC’s main function on Annares is providing necessities for the people and
appointing jobs. All work on Annares is voluntary and everyone receives the same
amount of food and clothing, the same kind of domicile, and the same amount of bedding.
That the people of Annares begin to fail their Odonian ideals of equality and community
can only be the fault of those who participate in the community.
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Along with asserting that dominance is tied to human instinct, The Dispossessed
follows the logic that ownership and control are at the heart of human motivation. Le
Guin argues that it is human habit to want to own, dominate, and destroy. The choices
that the Annaresti make which lead them further from Odonianism are the same choices
that Le Guin recognizes in American society. Odo, a woman who saw the need to end
the dominance of the “propertied” class and to live in cooperation with the earth and
produce as little waste as possible, espoused a philosophy that is parallel to contemporary
ecofeminism. Le Guin creates Odo as a legendary figure who now represents a utopia
unto herself, someone who made the right choices. Of human motivation Odo wrote, “A
child free from the guilt of ownership and the burden of economic competition will grow
up with the will to do what needs doing and the capacity for joy in doing it. It is useless
work that darkens the heart” (247). Since all possible necessities are provided by the
PDC, all work is voluntary and there is no concept of money. According to Benfield, Le
Guin “points out how narrow and incomplete our usual views of human motivation may
be” (128). We assume that humans want to own things and will work hard to earn money
to buy things. However, Le Guin argues that without ownership human motivation
changes from a dominating and destructive logic to one that embraces community and the
greater good.
Le Guin also comments on how language constructs reality, an issue discussed by
radical feminists who believe that defaulting to masculine pronouns helps create an
androcentric culture. In The Dispossessed, the absence of possessive pronouns in
Odonian speech shows a conscious effort to eradicate the concepts of property from
Odonian culture. When Shevek is an infant, his caretakers refer to “the mother” instead
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of “his mother” and this same trend continues throughout Shevek’s account of Annares
(28). It takes only a few months of life on Urras, a world of ownership and laws, thieves
and crime, before Shevek speaks the Iotic language with skill. Shevek notes that he “is
accustomed to the constant use of the possessive pronoun by now, and spoke it without
self-consciousness” (134). After Shevek reflects on his life back on Annares, he becomes
physically ill with disgust at the ease with which he adjusts to life on Urras, the economy,
the idea of property, and the use of possessive pronouns. The Dispossessed emphasizes
that the subtle aspects of culture, such as the structure of language, steep humans in
cultural norms so that we often fail to question if such norms are ethical.
The Annaresti try to discourage self identification through ownership, but
inevitably, human nature begins to unravel the communal system of shared property.
During his last years of school, Shevek writes a book on the Simultaneity Principle, a
very complex perspective of the time-space relationship understandable only to Shevek, a
physics genius. In Shevek’s first encounter with betrayal, his mentor, Sabul, puts his
name on the book and postures as if the ideas were his own. When Shevek confronts
Sabul about this betrayal, Sabul accuses him of “egoizing” and argues that what is
important is the contribution of the ideas to the community instead of whose ideas they
are. Shevek conceded without rebutting that if Sabul believed what he said, then he
would not have troubled to put his name on the book. Sabul is Shevek’s main source of
distress on Annares and symbolizes the way in which the Odonians’ informal power
structures are becoming corrupt. Shevek does not want to own his idea of simultaneity;
however, he does not think it is right that some one else should claim it either. This
conflict opens Shevek’s eyes to other power struggles developing in the PDC. As power
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and coercion become realities in Odonian society for the first time, Shevek reaches out to
the Urrasti where he can do physics without bureaucratic interference. There he will learn
identity through ownership.
The Dispossessed also analyzes the ways that the logic of domination justifies
sexism and classism. Ecofeminist essayists Karen Warren and Jim Cheney explain that
“[e]cological feminism is a feminism which attempts to unite the demands of the
women’s movement with those of the ecological movement in order to bring about a
world and worldview that are not based on socioeconomic and conceptual structures of
domination” (244). Since contemporary ecofeminism focuses on equality for all people,
a shift away from the focus on equality for women of early ecofeminism, Le Guin’s
portrait of Urrasti classism and environmental destruction anticipates the future tenets of
this philosophy.
Le Guin’s discussion of subjugated groups involves both women and the labor
class. Shevek’s first encounter with inequality is to the detriment of Urrasti women. The
first Urrasti Shevek meets are a group of fellow scientists—all male. Shevek dines with
them and their wives at an enormous party during which Shevek naively asks “where are
other women?” (73). A helpful Urrasti scientist says “[j]ust tell us your preferences.
Nothing could be simpler to provide.” Shevek remains unaware that the men are offering
him a prostitute, having no reference for the concept, and presses on: “Are all the
scientists here men, then?” Incredulity and coughing ensues. Pae, another helpful Urrasti,
explains that all of the scientists on Urras are men because the women “can’t do the
math,” have “no head for abstract thought,” and “don’t belong.” He even goes as far as
to joke “what women call thinking is done with the uterus” but admits that “there’s
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always a few exceptions, God-awful brainy women with vaginal atrophy” (73-74). This
is Shevek’s first encounter with constructions of gender differences and sexism.
Shevek’s personal history with women has taught him that they are not inferior as
the Urrasti believe. His mother and partner are both brilliant women and top performers
in their respective scientific fields. Shevek’s earliest mentor and the most prolific,
revered Annaresti physicist is a woman whose work the Urrasti scientists have all studied.
When Shevek points this out, the Urrasti scientists are genuinely surprised. Finally
Shevek states the obvious difference between his culture and theirs: “Odo was a woman”
(74). At this, the discussion fizzles. Shevek begins to ponder what kind of people these
must be that do not allow women certain lifestyles or choices. Daniel Sabia writes that
Le Guin’s motive in this particular dialog is to establish immediately Urras as a
maldeveloping society. He writes,
Hence, social survival and well-being require individual well-being; any
decent social order must promote the overall development of individuals,
and must encourage and protect their freedom, so they can thrive and
contribute to society, fulfill social functions, initiate needed action, and
innovate and take risks when opportunities and dangers appear. (192)
The kind of unexamined thought and denial of women’s autonomy displayed by the
Urrasti not only bodes poorly for the future of Urras but also indicates that these wellmeaning men are potentially dangerous. Le Guin speaks the danger of sexism in her 1982
keynote address to an abortion rights conference. She reasons that anti-abortion people
are not pro-life but rather pro-control over women and that this control prevents women
from functioning as autonomous individuals. About her own illegal abortion she resolves,
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“I did what I had to do so that I could do the work I was put here to do” (“The Princess”
78). Le Guin’s criticism of Urrasti life comes from the belief that prevention of
autonomy is a sign of a destructive society.
Although startling initially, Shevek soon finds the class systems he encounters on
Urras are easy for him to accept—as long as he remains is in favor with those in power.
Amidst the parties, the servants, and the property, Shevek realizes that the real motive
behind the kindness of his hosts is that they are using him for his knowledge of the
Simultaneity Principle. He is disgusted and ashamed that he has been a participating in
his own abuse. Shevek seeks out an underground organization of dissenters in the Urrasti
labor class. He finds that the revolutionary organization has been rejoicing his arrival to
Urras and sees him as a sign that another revolution is near. Shevek is humbled that he
symbolizes to them what he nearly forgot he was. This illustration of Shevek’s unwitting
participation in hegemony exposes human nature’s tendency to engage in oppression.
Earlier, on Annares, Shevek feels the instinctual power of dominance when he
first sees his newborn daughter. He examines her, small and defenseless, and “knew
consciously, as he had not done before what the attraction of cruelty is, why the strong
torment the weak” (361). Le Guin stresses that the capacity for cruelty is a human one.
Shevek loves his daughter and is aware of his power over her. It does not matter whether
Shevek is a Urrasti or an Odonian; cruelty and oppression are human tendencies that we
must work against.
The Left Hand of Darkness and The Dispossessed both attempt to awaken their
readers to the disastrous realities of our current relationship with the earth and the
environment. In both novels, Le Guin makes ecological sustainability part of the culture
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inhabiting her utopias. In one of his essays, Werner Christine Mathisen analyzes the ecopolitics within Huxley’s The Island, Le Guin’s The Dispossessed, and Callenbach’s
Ecotopia. He criticizes these authors for failing to detail what a ecological utopian
government might look like. In spite of this criticism, Mathisen agrees with Le Guin’s
approach in creating Annares. He writes, “If the goal is to alter culture in a certain
direction, then the medium of that transformation is culture itself. Thus we should learn
more about the social conditions and the cultural institutions in these three utopias” (59).
Le Guin does not aim to reinvent government; in fact, the Annaresti do their best to
abstain from government. What Le Guin does well is target dominant culture as the
institution deserving change and then conceptualizes her vision of an alternate, hopefully
improved culture. The result is a semi-utopia whose mistakes and achievements are well
conjectured and worth learning from.
In matters of environmental sustainability, the Urrasti and Odonian cultures differ
most in their production of waste. Conservation is a fundamental characteristic of
Odonianism and is likely a reaction to the flagrant wastefulness of Urrasti culture. After
the revolution, the Odonians migrated to Annares and began to live out their ideals of
equality and sustainability, working with their new world instead of against it. In Odo’s
manifesto, she wrote “Excess is excrement … Excrement retained in the body is a
poison” (98). “Excess is excrement” became the motto for the Odonian way of life. The
sterile moon on which the Odonians live gives them little opportunity for excess.
Annares is a bleak desert land with no naturally occurring life except for small aquatic
creatures surviving in the extremely salty oceans. This is one reason the Odonians keep a
vegetarian diet. Aside from pure utility, “strong social conscience functions as an
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effective impediment to wasteful consumptions, and the people of Annares react against
waste not only for ecological reasons” (Mathisen 64). They cannot afford to waste
anything because the land produces very little; therefore, everything they make is
reusable. If an Odonian has an extra blanket or piece of clothing, he or she will give it
back to the PDC so that the item can be redistributed to someone who needs it. They
have effectively eliminated all means of waste.
Shevek notices the Urrasti relationship with waste aligns with their system of
ethics. He first encounters trash when he is on the Urrasti spaceship enroute to Urras.
The doctor attending to him throws away a piece of paper and Shevek asks, “What
happens to the paper?” (12). The doctor answers, “Disposal, it gets burned up.” Shevek
is flabbergasted. He confirms, “you burn paper?” In all of Shevek’s thirty years he has
never seen anything disposed of. Towards the end of his visit on Urras, Shevek meets a
Terran whose description of Terran culture is very similar to American culture. Currently,
however, he says “There are no forests left on my earth. The air is grey, the sky is grey,
it is always hot…You Odonians chose a desert, we Terrans made a desert…” (348). They
discuss Urras’s equally dismal future alluding to such ecological stressors as air pollution,
overpopulation, and the devastation of eco-systems. Shevek muses that the common
thread between Terrans and the Urrasti is their cultures’ relationship to property and
waste. On Urras ownership leads to dominance and dominance leads to waste.
According to Le Guin’s ecofeminist commentary, any exertion of power of one group
over another will lead to waste and abuse.
At the aforementioned science fiction symposium in 1981, Le Guin asserted that
“[c]onquest is not finding and it is not thinking. Our culture, which conquered what is
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called the New World, and which sees the world of nature as an adversary to be
conquered: look at us now. Running out of everything” (“World-Making” 47). Le Guin
expresses the ecological and social implications derived from human nature’s patterns of
domination. Through Shevek’s critique of Annaresti society, she asks that we, too,
examine our own cultural history and remain vigilant. If we can understand that we are
the participants in our own social maldevelopment, then we can also understand that the
next step is reformation.
In our case, Le Guin does not recommend the overthrow of our governing
institutions. The revolution she means for us is internal and individual. On Urras,
Shevek attends a museum with a newly acquired friend, Vea. While admiring the
artifacts of Queen Teaea,Vea “raises the important issue of internal versus external
restraints on freedom” (Benfield 130). According to Queen Teaea’s legend, she lives as a
tyrant inside the heads of her citizens. Vea compares Shevek to one of Queen Teaea’s
serfs because he acts morally without any lawful obligation to do so. Shevek jokes that
Queen Teaea belongs in his head, to which Vea insists that it is better to have her in a
physical palace where he can rebel against her. As an Odonian, Shevek knows that
rebellion against the “tyrants” in our minds is the true victory.
Le Guin insists that this rebellion must be ongoing. When a mass of protestors
surround Shevek, he is moved by their passion and agrees to give a speech in which he
says, “You cannot take what you have not given and you must give yourself. You cannot
buy the revolution. You cannot make the revolution. You can only be the revolution. It
is in your spirit or it is nowhere” (310). According to Le Guin, it is not within our nature
to want to share, preserve, or sacrifice. The logic of domination is cultural and historical.
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If it was a survival instinct that instilled selfishness and brutality in our nature, then
ecofeminism asserts it is for our survival that we must fight against these qualities now.
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Chapter III
One and the Other
Ursula K. Le Guin and Margaret Atwood produced their significant early works
just as ecofeminism began to emerge as a social movement drawing participants to
academic conferences throughout the country. The publication of The Left Hand of
Darkness (1969), helped distinguish Le Guin as a writer who incorporates critical theory
into her novels by challenging the power roles of government and gender. Her later
exploration of classism and property as themes of dominance in The Dispossessed (1974)
shows the quickening social current of ecofeminism in the four years between these
novels. In 1972, Margaret Atwood published her second novel Surfacing, which placed
her in the company of Ursula Le Guin, Marge Piercy, Susan Griffin, Alice Walker and
others who were also working to combine environmentalist and feminist thought in
fiction. Surfacing, a title which seems to describe the building up or converging of these
two movements, is noted by literary critic George Woodcock as “the first successful
novel of a writer who … seemed destined to become a leader of the generation of young
and talented writers emerging during the early 1970s” (14). Along with its undeniable
significance in Atwood’s career, Surfacing also signifies the development of the
emotional and personal impetuses behind ecofeminism.
Surfacing departs from the science fiction convention used by Le Guin of creating
new worlds meant for critical comparison to our own world. However, its approach to
ecofeminism matches Le Guin’s use of utopias and dystopias, which less ambiguously
note the wrong and the right paths of cultural development. Later, in The Handmaid’s
Tale (1985), Atwood uses the science fiction and utopian genres to discuss a much
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advanced ecofeminism in a way that calls back to The Left Hand of Darkness and The
Dispossessed. Uniquely, Surfacing captures a pre-science fiction Atwood treating themes
of environmentalism and feminism in a refreshingly emotional voice that prompts its
readers to adopt the logic of care. If Surfacing does not match Le Guin’s works in genre,
it certainly does in theme. Before Surfacing, Atwood published several volumes of
poetry as well as her first novel The Edible Woman (1969), which explores the psyche of
a woman who empathizes with her food and feels that to men, she is a dominated cut of
meat. In this, her first novel, Atwood explores the social station of women and compares
the pursuing, containing, and killing of animals to the pursuing, obtaining, and
degradation of women. In Edible Woman, Atwood examines the negative perspectives of
women that arise from upholding this theme of woman as nature. Surfacing takes woman
as nature to the next level, examining woman as other and the harmful social
ramifications that are the results of designating a weaker sex. The novel also heavily
contemplates dialectical ecofeminism, which argues that to subvert dominance is to deny
essentialism. Finally, the novel posits that women’s link to nature is not inherent
maternalism but rather the fulfillment of the caretaker role and recognition that human
fate is tied to the earth’s. Because Surfacing examines some of the founding themes upon
which ecofeminist rhetoric still grows, this analysis sheds light on Atwood’s development
as an ecofeminist thinker and helps elucidate literature’s contribution to the burgeoning
and continuation of this philosophy.
Simply, Surfacing is about essentialism: what women are and what they are not.
One of the biggest criticisms of cultural feminism is its proliferation of essentialist
arguments about the nature of women. In its attempts to release women from roles
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determined for them by patriarchal society, cultural feminism risks containing women in
another box with other labels and other specified roles. The feminist goal is to not
pigeon-hole or label anybody. In a sense, “[cultural feminists] avoid biological
determinism but fall into the trap of ‘sociological determinism,’” which may be even
harder to escape (MacGregor 7). Contemporary ecofeminism, which grew alongside the
postmodern feminism of the 1990s, now widely contends that essentialist arguments are
detrimental to ecofeminist goals. Margaret Atwood has this same premonition thirty
years earlier. Atwood’s exploration of woman as other is a reaction to the patriarchal and
time-honored comparisons of women and nature that suggest both are inhuman and
therefore impotent. Le Guin also incorporates woman as other in The Left Hand of
Darkness through Genly Ai’s reflexive distrust of Estraven’s feminine side. Clearly
Genly comes from a patriarchal society that others women and views them as
untrustworthy. Unlike Atwood, Le Guin’s critique on the social othering of women ends
after making the point that the practice is used to justify abuse. In Surfacing, Atwood
writes from the perspective of a woman who is isolated by that presence of patriarchy and
is experiencing the emotional trauma of othering. She is caught in the basic social trap of
essentialism as used by masculine consciousness: the two-level hierarchy separating the
patriarch at the top with everything else, or the “other,” beneath him.
The anti-essentialism in Surfacing makes the point that any label placing women
outside of the realm of empowerment, whether the label is mother, artist, feminist, or
professional, is limiting; to be allowed only one role in a sea of inferior roles is
degradation. Atwood begins the motif of woman as other by choosing to leave her
protagonist unnamed. As promised by this motif, much of the character’s anxiety is
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brought on by her refusal to meet the expectations of the men in her life. As the plot
reveals, traditionally “masculine consciousness denigrated and manipulated everything
defined as ‘other’ whether nature, women, or Third World cultures” (Diamond and
Orenstein x). The protagonist discovers that designating the “other” is a large part of the
dominant culture’s power. The novel opens in media res. The protagonist is in a car
with her friends—her boyfriend Joe and a married couple, David and Anna. They are
leaving Toronto and heading toward backwoods Quebec to the isolated island home
where the narrator grew up This exodus from big-city life provides the characteristically
ecofeminist comparison of two worlds. On this vacation with her friends, the narrator
hopes to find her missing father and recover the part of herself she lost to urban life. She
finds that the patriarchal interactions within the group are out of place on land that she
associates with environmental cooperation and sustainable living.
David is an example of a patriarch who has established the “original” hierarchy,
othering his wife, the narrator, and the primitive habitat they are visiting. Atwood’s
rhetoric is anti-essentialist in painting David as a ridiculous, awkward character who is
entirely convinced of his role as natural dominator. The marriage between Anna and
David is its own microcosm in which the severity of the power relationship and
domination of Anna disgusts the on-looking narrator. Anna discloses that David has
never seen her without make-up, cheats on her, and forces her to take birth control pills.
David punishes Anna through sex either by abstaining or by engaging in violent
intercourse. On this Anna says, “He’s got this little set of rules. If I break one of them I
get punished, except he keeps changing them so I’m never sure” (123). David confronts
the narrator with his misogyny in an awkward proposition for sex. When she declines by
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saying “you don’t turn me on,” he loses his poise and calls her a “tight-assed bitch” (153).
Immediately she notes, “power flowed into my eyes.” At David’s outburst, the narrator is
able to see clearly his charade of power. It comes as no surprise that David has the same
attitude toward nature that he has toward women. He wants to hunt and fish, which are
acts of dominance, but does not know how to turn his kill into food, which is an act of
sustainability. With the narrator’s help, David is able to catch a fish on his line but then
asks the narrator to kill it. The narrator prepares the fish as food so that she does not feel
guilty for its death. While David may be convinced of man’s biologically determined
superiority in his male-dominated urban habitat, his true impotency is revealed after only
a couple of days in nature.
The protagonist refuses to laugh at David’s jokes or play along with the generally
oppressive norms of the group. As a result the group, ostensibly lead by David,
designates the protagonist as other. They do not help her with cooking, cleaning,
gathering logs for the fire or any of the set-up and pick-up when the group goes camping.
No other member of the party offers to help and perhaps it does not even occur to them
that it is not the protagonist’s duty to serve them. As she rises early and begins to prepare
for the day, the protagonist notes “I carry the food inside and start the breakfast. Joe and
David are up, Joe is sitting on the wall bench, face still fuzzy with sleep, David
examining his chin in the mirror” (41). She does not ask her friends to help or enter into
a dialogue about her feelings. Canadian literary scholar Ged Martin surmises that “[t]he
narrator does not perceive herself as an agent of action, but as a survivor, a victim” (108).
She has survived a coerced abortion and an abusive marriage and now feels victimized by
her role as other. She feels paralyzed in this role and so does not actively fight her
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oppression. At dinner, after the narrator turns down David’s proposition, he accuses her
of hating men, stating “[e]ither that or she wants to be one. Right?” (155). The narrator
does not answer David’s with-us-or-against-us ultimatum. Anna seems to answer for her,
saying “God, she really is inhuman.” Anna, a victim herself, betrays the sisterhood
between the women and completes the othering of the narrator, ultimately supporting
David’s hegemony.
Atwood uses the woman-as-nature theme in a couple of different ways. The first
way argues that the identification of woman as nature is not necessarily productive to the
ecofeminist cause, and the second way examines women as earthly caretakers. The latter
will be discussed later in this analysis. Woman as other grew from woman as nature, a
common cultural construct in masculine consciousness. The protagonist’s identification
with nature goes beyond fulfilling a time-honored stereotype of gender identity and
explores how the grouping of woman and nature is detrimental to women’s place in
society as well as the environment’s place in politics. Because the protagonist grew up in
the remote, woodsy setting of this novel, she identifies with it as family and feels
responsible for protecting it. As she is increasingly disturbed by her friends’ presence at
her childhood home, she begins to physically identify with nature. While walking
outside at night, the protagonist muses “[m]y tentacled feet and free hand scent out the
way, shoes are a barrier between touch and earth” (165). Some critics suggest that
“because the body becomes a site of subjection for women, Atwoodian heroines
experience a strong sense of unease about the body” and feel relieved to deny masculinity
by identifying with a traditionally feminine concept (Parker 368). While some cultural
feminist readings of Surfacing insist that “this [thinking] implies a rejection of
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masculinity incorporating reason, discourse, culture, and the mind, and an affirmation of
femininity as the locus of irrationality, silence, nature and the body” (Ozdemir 66),
contemporary ecofeminists argue that the association is not productive. Espousing a
connection between the domination of women and nature is not the same as identifying
woman as nature. The latter others her as a non-participant in culture and society. When
the protagonist does not find solace in her new identity, she becomes mad with
desperation, belonging nowhere. Surfacing shows how woman as nature is a weighty
part of cultural feminism’s essentialist problems and illustrates how woman as nature
does not hold a glorious Gaia-esque identity but rather re-establishes woman as other.
One solution to essentialism is role negotiation. Dialectical ecofeminism is an
anti-essentialist perspective that views people as holders of multiple, simultaneous, and
often opposing roles. For ecofeminism this means that instead of trapping women into
identification with nature so that they forfeit any possible footing in society, people must
try to move away from the idea of hard-set dualities. Diamond and Orenstein insist that
“[o]nce the critique of such dualities as culture and nature, reason and emotion, human
and animal has been posed, ecofeminism seeks to reweave new stories that acknowledge
and value the biological and cultural diversity that sustains all life” (xi). Although
dialectical ecofeminism as a widely discussed presence is relatively recent, first discussed
in essays in the early 1990s, Atwood’s knack for predicting the future rhetoric of the
movement does not falter here. The protagonist in Surfacing juggles multiple roles
unsuccessfully either because masculine society does not allow her to assume more than
one role at once, or because it does not allow her to have two “opposing” roles.
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Atwood raises the question, as the narrator psychologically changes into an
animal, is she changing or simply recognizing a deeper part of herself? Fiona Tolan’s
dialectical ecofeminist reading of the narrator’s transformation suggests that “[i]n
relinquishing her victimhood, the system of irreconcilable opposites that she has set up
offers aggression as the only alternative … the narrator recoils from humanity … and is
faced with the uncomfortable fact of her own capacity for human destruction” (110-111).
The narrator is at once woman, human, and animal. She attempts to reconcile these roles
by imploring Joe, her nice-enough boyfriend, to become an animal with her. Joe is quiet
and sad throughout the vacation because the protagonist will not return his declaration of
love. As she slips into this Gaia persona, she is only able to make love to Joe one night
when she pulls him out of the cabin and feels his “fur” in the dark and imagines that they
are both animals. She thinks, “He needs to grow more fur” (164). When Joe tells her he
loves her, she tells herself, “he’s holding back, he wants to be like the city, baroque
scrollwork, intricate as a computer, but I’m impatient, pleasure is redundant, the animals
don’t have pleasure” (165). That the narrator is unable to find peace holding multiple
roles is a result of masculine society’s refusal to acknowledge them. Masculine
consciousness’s ability to accept or deny any claim as reality is an ostensible use of its
power as the dominant culture.
The protagonist’s dialectical personality confuses some critics about why she
refuses to confront her oppressors. Most notably, Ozdemir points out that “[p]ower
relations between men and women in Atwood’s writing, particularly in Surfacing, are an
ambiguous theme because her heroines are never totally innocent or helpless victims in
the hands of male oppressors” (63). The motif of silence Surfacing at once isolates and
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further oppresses the protagonist, who refuses to answer or object when her male
companions are taunting her or making lewd comments to Anna. Particularly asinine is
the scene in which David tells Anna to take off her clothes for the movie the men are
filming. Anna refuses and David says “ just take it off like a good girl, or I’ll have to
take it off for you” (136). When David threatens to throw Anna into the lake she agrees
to take off her bathing suit. Once stripped, Anna jumps into the lake by herself. David
asks Joe if he was able to get Anna’s nudity on camera and Joe, perhaps sarcastic or
perhaps not, replies “[m]aybe you could order her to do it again” (137). Joe is a character
who recognizes the harm of the patriarchy but is too socially brainwashed to do anything
to change it. The protagonist, on the other hand, silently watched this entire scene from
the porch and—although it made her furious—did not defend Anna or confront the men
about it.
Dialectical ecofeminism argues that nothing is black and white. Living in a
society that relies on dualities is dangerous because this logic does not allow us to
understand the nature of being. Perhaps the protagonist’s struggles mirror Atwood’s own.
Tolan writes that “Atwood charges both feminists and Canadians with perpetuating their
victim status, yet struggles to reconcile her instinctual liberalism with a simultaneous
belief in communal guilt and mutual responsibility” (105). Atwood sees the essentialist
mistakes in cultural feminism as harmful to the goals of equality but also understands that
placing blame can be just as unproductive. The protagonist must have these diverging
traits—intelligence and impotence, sensitivity and dispassion—for Atwood to accurately
depict the inward struggles and choices that give both men and women their autonomy.
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Like Atwood, the protagonist confronts blame, which seems a necessity in every
solution but which also has harmful essentialist tendencies. The protagonist tries to
assess why David and Anna are still together even though they appear to loathe each
other. She says, “I remember what Anna had said about emotional commitments:
they’ve made one, I thought, they hate each other; that must be almost as absorbing as
love” (139). The protagonist does not blame Anna for her complacency because she is
also dealing with her own. One of the most difficult qualities to understand about the
protagonist is that she both sees the oppression and plays into the hegemony with her
silence. Although at times this combination can be unnerving to readers, it also helps
depict the protagonist as a true-to-life character. Anna betrays the protagonist multiple
times throughout the novel, sleeping with Joe and telling the men that the protagonist
damaged their film equipment, but the protagonist does not pass judgment on Anna
because then she would also have to judge herself. Dialectical ecofeminism assumes that
all people contain what masculine society has called “opposite” traits. Without the
pressure of labels and the pressure to comply with one role at a time, dialectical
ecofeminism allows failure, education, and progress, understanding that for a social
movement and philosophy to work it must account for human nature, which is many
things at the same time.
A final theme in Surfacing is the rejection of maternalism. At times throughout
the novel, the protagonist feels guilty about her abortion but reasons that because she was
coerced into the relationship and pregnancy by a man she did not love, the fetus was not
really hers. She muses, “[l]eaving my child, that was the unpardonable sin; it was no use
trying to explain to them why it wasn’t really mine. But I admit I was stupid, stupidity is
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the same as evil if you judge by the results, and I didn’t have any excuses, I was never
good at them” (25). Following the anti-essentialist trend of the novel, anti-maternalism
explores the role of the heroine who rejects the feminine role of mother and instead takes
an unexpected route to ecofeminism. As noted in the introduction, there are three
different strains of ecofeminism. The protagonist appeals to the third strain, which
purports “the perspective of indigenous peoples, whose connection to native lands is
essential to their being and identity, it is both true that the earth has intrinsic value and
that we are also dependent on her” (Diamond and Orenstein xii). This perspective, which
is the most contemporary of the three strains, combines the first two—intrinsic value and
earthly dependence—to make one dialectical perspective.
The protagonist rejects motherhood but remains an earthly caretaker. This
representation of dialectical ecofeminism suggests that while only women can give birth,
both women and men can be caretakers. This is an important tenet to develop in
ecofeminist thought which seeks to convince humankind that all people are equal and
equally indebted to the earth. In the introduction to her book, Beyond Mothering Earth,
ecofeminist researcher and political scientist Sherylin MacGregor writes,
[a]ware that charges of essentialism have long undermined ecofeminism,
these theorists emphasize that the link they make is a socio-material and
experiential one: women’s mothering and caregiving work mediates the
relationship between people and nature and thereby engenders a caring
stance towards nature. This rhetoric of “ecomaternalism,” as I call it, is
pervasive in much of the contemporary ecofeminist discourse. (4)
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The argument that women’s main connection to ecofeminism is motherhood is to place
women back into the bonds of biological reductionism, wherein they are considered
birthing mechanisms instead of whole persons. It is an important consistency in
Atwood’s dialectical ecofeminist perspective that the protagonist rejects motherhood but
retains the logic of care. Perhaps the protagonist’s only activism is caring for the earth.
After David catches a fish, the protagonist secretly releases the frogs (their bait) into the
lake. She explains, “they slipped into the water, green with black leopard spots and gold
eyes, rescued” (121). That the protagonist never verbally or physically defends herself
against the presence of dominance but suddenly animates when nature is threatened
reveals a genderless, parental altruism toward the environment.
While white Canadians are clearly not indigenous peoples, Canadian literature
and culture professes they are humans who identify with the land and who have a will to
protect it. The development of this nationalistic, environmental pride may be due to
Canada’s relatively peaceful history and long experience with British colonial domination
(Wright). The protagonist feels akin with the land she knew as a child and feels that
masculine socialization has taken her away from her original identity. Upon returning
home for the first time in over a decade, the protagonist studies the land, garden, and
wooden cottage as if rediscovering something she had forgotten about herself. She traces
the trails she traversed as a child, digs in the soil of her father’s garden and looks at her
reflection in the lake. Her indigenous peoples’ approach to ecofeminism is challenged
when she encounters two men who she assumes are American because of their new
fishing gear and shiny canoe that to her make it obvious they are catching illegal fish.
When on a later encounter they reveal that they are from Toronto, the protagonist thinks
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to herself “[t]hey are still Americans” (123). This is a turning point in the protagonist’s
consciousness. She is unable to believe that these men can be both Canadian and
destructive, although she only needs to look at her current company to establish this.
The protagonist’s failure to keep a dialectical perspective that allows multiple
roles and identities thwarts her ecofeminist journey. Her judgment on the fishermen
places her at an impasse with her life as a human who is at once capable of caregiving
and destruction. In a maddened attempt to deny the guilt of her humanity, she begins to
psychologically transform into an animal. Clearly going mad, the narrator describes her
imaginary physical transformation: “[s]omething has happened to my eyes, my feet are
released, they alternate, several inches from the ground. I’m ice-clear, transparent, my
bones and the child inside me showing through the green webs of my flesh, the ribs are
shadows, the muscles jelly…” (187). This transformation is a contradiction to the antiessentialism found earlier in the text. Whereas before the transformation she denies the
masculine culture which identifies her as mother and nature, during the transformation
she surrenders, running unintentionally back into the braces of the dominant paradigm.
Of this capitulation Tolan writes, “[w]hen the narrator does succumb to the wilderness, it
is not in triumphant identification with nature but as a reprehensible abdication of her
social responsibility” (110). By the end of the novel, the protagonist has unraveled under
the pressure of labels, masculine expectations, and her own silence. While she cannot be
analyzed as a person of sound mind in the last four chapters, the protagonist reminds us
of how harmful mindsets within ecofeminism can endanger its development and lead it to
betray its goals.
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Just as Le Guin leaves us with a call to action in The Dispossessed, Atwood warns
us that we must be willing to make an emotional commitment to the ecofeminist cause.
As ecofeminist literary critic Stephanie Lahar writes, “social projects must be both deeply
personal and political to render transformative change” (7). As understood through the
various conflicts in Surfacing, a large part of the emotional commitment to ecofeminism
is the willingness to relearn our understanding of identity and adopt a dialectical
viewpoint. In an interview with J.R. (Tim) Struthers in 1976, as Surfacing basks in
critical acclaim and academic analysis, Maragret Atwood speaks candidly of her growing
popularity. Struthers asks, “[d]o you feel you are being treated too seriously?” Atwood
answers,
I think a lot of the furor is extra-literary; that is, it doesn’t have that much
to do with my actual work. It has to do with the phenomenon of
somebody my age, of my sex … doing all these different books, and also
making fairly strong statements, and what you have is a conflict of roles.
If I were male and sixty-two, nobody would bat an eyelash about a lot of
this, I’m sure. (68)
Atwood’s personal experience with role conflict is expressed in Surfacing through the
protagonist’s struggles. Atwood argues that to accept one identity is to surrender.
Through the exploration of woman as other, dialectical feminism, and the indigenous
peoples’ perspective on earthly caretakers, Atwood gives ecofeminism a much-needed
evaluation. She predicts ecofeminism’s growth into a dialectical mindset and offers good
advice about the need to monitor the development of this philosophy. Surfacing’s overall
message is that the masculine argument “we are man and therefore we are not nature” is a
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dangerous use of essentialism. For Atwood, the answer is not that women represent
nature but rather that humankind is part of nature. Through this novel, she warns that if
we fool ourselves into believing the human race is not part of nature then we will use this
logic to abuse nature and degrade each other.
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Chapter IV
The End is Here
Three decades after the emergence of ecofeminism, fear of human destruction was
still a major component of American consciousness. The threat of nuclear weapons in
Iraq compounded by national outrage at terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World
Trade Center towers set the stage for a new theatre of warfare. In March of 2003, the
United States announced its plans to invade Iraq and strengthen its efforts in a
corresponding War on Terror in Afghanistan. This same year, Margaret Atwood
published Oryx and Crake, an apocalyptic, dystopian novel that warns of a future where
technological and scientific advances commodify human life instead of improving its
quality. In her essay on the process of writing Oryx and Crake, Atwood explained that
she heard the news of the attacks on the World Trade Center after returning from a bird
sanctuary where she had stayed immersed in nature for days. She explains that the
serenity of the previous week mixed with devastating news of the attacks created an
unshakable image of apocalypse and the fragility of humankind. She says “the story
came to me in an instant. I had only to write it down” (Writing).
In writing Oryx and Crake, Atwood captures the tone of the twenty-first century
ecofeminist. The novel focuses on the early ecofeminist concerns of technological
annihilation and androcentric history and examines them in terms of present-day Western
culture. Technological annihilation is a concern that grew from the original ecofeminist
demilitarization sentiments of the 1970s, during the Vietnam and Cold Wars. By the time
Oryx and Crake was published in 2003, ecofeminism and Third Wave feminism alike had
begun to focus on developing nations’ struggles with technology. Like demilitarization,
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technological annihilation criticisms include concern for human and earthly destruction
by nuclear warfare and the dangers of an overly militaristic society, but they also speak to
the concerns of integrating technology with human life. The early ecofeminist tenet of
ahistory also morphed to keep up with the changing social climate. “Cultural lobotomy”
is a metaphor used to describe the ecofeminist idea of unlearning maldevelopments in
androcentric culture. The environmentalists and feminists who once explained dominance
and subjugation as the results of early human maldevelopment offered ahistory, or the
social and cultural disconnection from a maldeveloped past, as a possible answer to the
problems of power. By the twenty-first century, criticisms of cultural lobotomy, or
reinventing history by starting over, entered ecofeminist discourse.
Similar to the protagonist’s friends in Surfacing, the humans in Oryx and Crake
are culturally removed from the natural world and thus value organic life, even human
life, very little. Oryx and Crake is sometimes categorized as science fiction but Atwood
prefers to describe it as speculative fiction, and in many important ways the novel
speculates about the gruesome end to a rapidly maldeveloping society. Upholding the
utopian/dystopian themes of the three previous novels, Atwood’s ecofeminist
speculations are illustrated through two contrasting societies. In this case, however, they
are both dystopian, one bad and one worse; the worlds are pre- and post-apolocyptic
Earth.
Jimmy, as he is known pre-apocalypse, or Snowman, as he calls himself postapocalypse, is one of Atwood’s very few male protagonists. Jimmy grows up in a
technologically advanced culture that is enthralled with destruction. In adulthood, he
witnesses his best friend, Crake, create a virus that successfully destroys the entire human
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race and replace it with a new, genetically engineered race Jimmy calls the Crakers. The
novel opens after Crake’s apocalypse with Jimmy, now Snowman, surviving hour to hour
in an urban jungle. Chapter two introduces Jimmy as a young boy living on a corporate
compound with his parents. The chapters alternate from Jimmy to Snowman until the
two characters converge in the present and Snowman has to decide whether to remain
alone with the Crakers or risk his life trying to find other human survivors.
Like feminism’s third wave, ecofeminism has focused much of its recent social
growth on the inclusion of all dominated groups, specifically those of the developing
world, where the sudden imposition of technology directly endangers the land and lives
of indigenous peoples. Oryx and Crake’s theme of technological annihilation is a
criticism of Western culture’s dialectical relationship with nature and technology. The
novel examines our want to incorporate technology and the want to be free from it.
Technology operates as part of the logic of domination insomuch that, as a term, it begins
to stand in for culture. Instead of focusing on social paradigms wherein dominant
cultures subjugate weaker groups and the environment, technology becomes the
instrument of control, an extension man/culture essentialism. Val Plumwood discusses
the Western rationale that humans are separate from nature, noting, “[o]ne key aspect of
the Western view of nature… is the view of nature as sharply discontinuous or
ontologically divided from the human sphere. This leads to a view of humans as apart
from or ‘outside of’ nature, usually as masters or external controllers of it” (162). In Oryx
and Crake, Atwood speculates what happens when humans identify with technology and
bastardize nature.
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In their essay on ecofeminist utopias, Cathleen McGuire and Colleen McGuire
provide a comparative analysis on Woman on the Edge of Time (1976) by Marge Piercy
and The Fifth Sacred Thing (1993) by Starhawk, in which they write, “it is in the nexus
between nature and technology that the authors most starkly demarcate the differences
between seventies radical feminism and ecofeminism, specifically through
biotechnology” (196). Such is the difference between Le Guin’s 1970s novels and Oryx
and Crake; both of Le Guin’s utopic societies, the Odonians and the Gethenians, rely on
technology due to harsh climates, food shortages, and government or organizational
needs. McGuire and McGuire write, “[w]hereas Starhawk relegates biotechnology to the
dystopic realm, Piercy incorporates it” (184). In Atwood’s dystopic depiction of a bioengineering society killed by its own technologies, she adapts the post-Cold War
ecofeminist criticisms (noted by Starhawk) to meet the expanding discourse on
technology versus the natural self and the natural world.
Disassociation with the natural self is a focus of both ecofeminism and feminism.
While feminism encourages fighting social pressure to conform to the male gaze,
ecofeminism explores the ways that altering the natural self creates a rift in human
identification with the environment. In Crake, Atwood creates an ecofeminist dystopian
character who embodies human identification with technology. In college, Crake says
that Nature and God are the barriers that keep human beings in order. When Jimmy says
“I thought you didn’t believe in God,” Crake says “I don’t believe in Nature either…Or
not with a capital N” (206). Crake believes he is in control of the universe.
As a youth, Crake rationalizes away any need for a relationship with nature and
instead promotes the idea that nature is flawed. Using a technology metaphor, Crake
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rationalizes murder, war, violence, and overpopulation as the results of flawed human
nature. He says “[w]e’re hormone robots” (166), meaning our natural impulses are
misguided and destructive. He vilifies nature for humanity’s imperfections. Although
Crake is Jimmy’s best friend, he is the ecofeminist antagonist, written as if inhuman. As
teenagers, Jimmy recalls, Crake was so desensitized to human suffering that in all of the
public executions, wars, and child pornography they accessed on the Internet, “he didn’t
seem to be affected by anything he saw, one way or the other, except when he thought it
was funny. He never seemed to get high, either” (86).
Cosmetics also contribute to the technological annihilation of nature in Oryx and
Crake. Atwood satirizes the over-reliance on cosmetics and self-improvement pills
initially through Ramona, Jimmy’s stepmother who kisses him “leaving a smooch of
cerise lipstick, he could feel it resting on his cheek like bicycle grease” (175). At his
father’s work, in the bio-engineered animals sector of the corporate compound where
they lived, Jimmy perceives even faux-nature as awkward and shameful in the context of
his world. He muses, “[t]he pigoons had no toilets and did it anywhere; this caused him a
vague sensation of shame” (26). Years later, as an adult, Jimmy works for Anooyoo,
copywriting for “[c]osmetic creams, workout equipment, Joltbars to build your musclescape into a breathtaking marvel of sculpted granite. Pills to make you fatter, thinner,
hairier, balder, whiter, browner, blacker, yellower, sexier, and happier” (248). Atwood
writes Jimmy as the unwitting ecofeminist protagonist who is sardonically aware “[h]ope
and fear, desire and revulsion, these were his stocks-in-trade, on these he rang his
changes.”
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Jimmy, as Snowman, resists the mainstream impulse to desire genetically altered,
technologically perfected women even when they are the only women left on earth.
Atwood writes that the Craker women “arouse in Snowman, not even the faintest stirrings
of lust. It was the thumbprints of human imperfection that used to move him, the flaws in
the design” (100). In the presence of Crake’s version of perfect humans, Snowman
recalls seeing DVDs of animals when he was a child which showed “mothers licking
their young” and wonders “[w]hy had he found them so reassuring?” (10). Atwood
implies that for all of humanity’s perceived imperfections, nature is still part of our
collective identity, one that we will crave if denied.
Atwood also comments on Western ecofeminism’s tendency toward what Noel
Sturgeon calls “the Third World difference” through Oryx. Similar to gothic literature’s
Magical Negro, “the Third World difference” denotes an oversimplified Magical
Southeast Asian woman, who represents all developing nation ecofeminist activists.
When criticizing the bulk of published ecofeminist anthologies, Sturgeon points out,
“[t]he discourse about Third World women in these books reduces all women in this
category to rural village women engaged in subsistence farming or food gathering.” (124).
Atwood describes Oryx vaguely as Southeast Asian, naturally beautiful, intelligent, and
mysterious. This description matches the dangerous oversimplification in Western
ecofeminism on behalf of developing nation ecofeminist activists. Jimmy obsessively
questions Oryx about her past but assumes that she is fabricating her story to humor him.
This is the same relationship Sturgeon points to when she writes about “the Third World
difference;” Jimmy does not allow himself to see any truth beyond the convenient,
stereotypical narrative of rice patties and child slavery, so this is what Oryx gives him.
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In the world of Oryx and Crake, where self obsessed humans resent their natural
bodies, aging, and are terrified of death, disassociation with the natural self necessarily
lends to disassociation with the natural world. As a child, Jimmy was told “ducks were
only like pictures, they weren’t real and had no feelings, but he didn’t quite believe it”
(15). Confused by the bio-engineered pigoons that were put to death because of infection,
Jimmy’s father told him the animals didn’t feel the bonfire: “they were like steaks and
sausages that still had their skins on” (18). Because the humans in Jimmy’s life live on
corporate compounds and the only animals they interact with are bio-engineered hybrids,
they develop a life-long cognitive dissonance between themselves and the natural world.
Crake’s identification with technology is a result of growing up in this faux-real world.
Crake eliminates the human race through bio-warfare. He creates BlyssPluss,
marketed as a catch-all supplement that turns people into the humans they want to be
(more of Atwood’s self-improvement satire) and also secretly contains an indestructible
bio-form meant to kill all humans. Bio-warfare is a 21st century twist on the 1970s threat
of nuclear holocaust and is literally the use of technology to turn life against itself. Crake,
an antagonist of the natural world, uses bio-warefare, in the form of a pill sent to the
major cities in every country, to attack the humanity and thereby nature that he loathes.
Through this transaction, Atwood illustrates that the more disconnected from the natural
world humanity becomes, the more we are in danger of technological annihilation.
Cognitively to Crake, humans are like the ducks Jimmy’s father described, “only like
pictures, they weren’t real and had no feelings.”
Ultimately, Atwood shows that humans contribute to technological annihilation
when we begin to identify with technology instead of nature. Once we have convinced
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ourselves that human essence does not lie with nature, then we allow ourselves to reject
the logic of earthly care. Crake and Jimmy’s childhood spent petting hybrid animals bred
for organ harvesting and their adolescence spent laughing at violent, pornographic media
desensitizes them to human suffering and renders them compassionless. Jimmy and
Crake are not concerned with those suffering in developing countries or even in the
“pleblands” of their own country. Atwood satires our present-day hyper-sexualized,
violent media culture by creating a world where humans are self-obsessed but resent their
natural selves—their inconstant libido, bulging bellies, hair loss, and wrinkles. By
creating characters that lack human compassion and resent their natural selves, Atwood
illustrates how nature becomes the enemy. By the time Crake has thoroughly vilified
nature, annihilating the human race never even crosses his mind as a question of ethics.
Along with exploring new concerns in the area of technological annihilation,
Atwood takes a contemporary ecofeminist approach to the theme of ahistory. Time is a
major theme in Oryx and Crake, not only in terms of narrative chronology but in the
characterization of time and what it means for the protagonist. Early ecofeminism, which
grew out of radical, or cultural, feminism, used ahistory to encourage a departure from
traditional androcentric history and the creation of a new history, building a new system
from the ground up. These theoretical movements were useful for paradigm subversion
in pedagogy, organizational, and interpersonal communication. However, contemporary
ecofeminism takes a slightly different view on history and time. Oryx and Crake warns
against the dangers of ahistory by illustrating what Brian Swimme calls a “cultural
lobotomy” (15), wherein historical amnesia causes the Crakers to repeat the past.
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We meet Snowman a few months after Crake’s epidemic. Oryx and Crake are
dead and Snowman knows no other living, natural human beside himself. His watch, too,
is dead although he looks at it often. Atwood writes, “[h]e wears it now as his only
talisman. A blank face is what it shows him: zero hour. It causes a jolt of terror to run
through him, this absence of official time. Nobody nowhere knows what time it is” (3).
In a sense, Crake has created ahistory. His intent was to start over with the “human
experiment” which he felt had gone horribly wrong. Snowman’s dead watch signifies the
obsolescence of time and human history. He watches the Crakers, masterfully engineered
by Crake, create their own history, peeing territorial lines in the sand, performing mating
dances, and baring children.
Oryx and Crake is really the story of Jimmy’s history. The second chapter begins
“[o]nce upon a time, Snowman wasn’t Snowman. Instead he was Jimmy. He’d been a
good boy then” (15). Like early humans, like the newborn infants, and, later, like the
Crakers, Jimmy begins his history benevolently. His early maldevelopment comes from
his dad, who tells him “[w]omen are always getting hot under the collar,” (or rather,
“women are irrational”) and, as previously noted, animals are just “sausages with their
skins still on” (16). This is the beginning of Jimmy’s maldevelopment. However rich in
human atrocity history is, Atwood argues that humans need their history to have a basis
for improvement and a reminder of what not to do. The Crakers, oblivious to human
history and engineered to have every biological chance at creating a better human society,
engage in familiar patterns of dominance and maldevelopment within the first few
months of their existence. In their essay on ecofeminist ethics, Karen Warren and Jim
Cheney assert that ecofeminism, as a living theory, relies on time and history for growth
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stating “it is something both ‘situated’ … and ‘in process,’ emerging from people’s
different experiences and observations and changing over time” (256). Atwood argues
that human culture has this same relationship with time, it is recorded by history and
redefined through time.
Instead of rejecting history, many contemporary ecofeminists look for answers to
cultural maldevelopment in ancient wisdom. In her essay on theology and nature, Carol
P. Christ suggests that cultural healing begins with “[a] recovery of more ancient and
traditional views that revere the profound connection of all beings in the web of life and a
rethinking of the relation of both humanity and divinity to nature” (58). Snowman’s
perspective lies close to Christ’s in that he constantly searches his memories for comfort
and for answers. Jimmy’s relationship to nature has changed greatly in the recent past.
He has gone from life in a sterile, corporate compound to life as an insect-bitten,
sunburned, nomad. Snowman chants arcane English words, mulls over memories from
early childhood, and replays conversations with his mother, father, Oryx, and Crake.
Without his past, he could not make sense of the present.
The Crakers, who have no past, are confused about their lives, their purpose,
where they came from, and more importantly where Snowman came from. Although
Crake did his best to exclude art, religion, and jokes from his Crakers, the Crakers turn to
Snowman for an explanation of their origin. In exchange for weekly fish dinners,
Snowman humors the Crakers with stories of Crake as God creating them out of mango
and Oryx laying an egg full of words. The Crakers begin to worship Snowman as a
prophet. Annoyed at the Crakers begging for scraps of history and pointing out his
contradictions, Snowman observes “[a]t first he’d improvised, but now they’re
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demanding dogma” (104). Even though Crake insisted that “[h]ierarchy could not exist
among them, because they lacked the neural complexes that would have created it,” the
Crakers readily placed Crake in a Godlike, omnipotence category; below him is Oryx,
and then Snowman, the prophet.
To solidify his ahistorical utopia, Crake tries to rid the Craker design of
“[s]ymbolic thinking of any kind” (361). Crake says of the Crakers, “[a]s soon as they
start doing art we’re in trouble.” Their first symbolic representation is a scarecrow-like
statue of Snowman which they erect when he leaves them for a few days to explore the
area. When Snowman returns, he finds the Crakers chanting, playing percussion, and
worshiping a statue of him. Riane Eisler argues that this behavior is inevitable because
human culture is “[t]he story not only of the fashioning of material tools but also of the
fashioning of our most important and unique non-material tools: the mental tools of
language and imagery, of humanmade words, symbols, and pictures” (32). The Crakers
could not exist without mutation or authenticity of some kind. The creation of their own
customs, hierarchies, and mythology is a result of their need to narrate history, which
contemporary ecofeminism argues is an important impulse in human culture. Atwood
concludes that because the Crakers were robbed the lessons of history, they are in no
better position to create a utopic humanity than the early humans were. Likely, they are
in a worse position.
Throughout Oryx and Crake Atwood maintains that annihilating the past does not
improve the future while still acknowledging the usefulness of ahistory in ecofeminism.
In her essay about writing Oryx and Crake, she states “[t]he rules of biology are as
inexorable as those of physics: run out of food and water and you die. No animal can
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exhaust its resource base and hope to survive. Human civilizations are subject to the same
law” (Writing). She writes similar words for Crake who he muses out loud to Jimmy
“[h]omo sapiens doesn’t seem able to cut himself off at the supply end. He’s one of the
few species that doesn’t limit reproduction in the face of dwindling resources” (120).
Here Atwood recognizes the argument of ahistory as a kind of logic that misses the
bigger picture. This statement to Jimmy is one of Crake’s staple justifications for wanting
to destroy the human race. He argues that the world would be better off without the
current model of humanity and that humans themselves are miserable and self-destructive.
As a contemporary ecofeminist writer, Atwood intercepts this logic, that we must depart
from androcentric history, and insists that we must use what we have—a history rich in
lessons on atrocity—and build a better human culture from there.
Atwood’s satire of the relationship between humans and technology shows that
while humans control technology, it is our main tool of self-destruction. Through the
Crakers Atwood makes the point that, if we forget this wisdom, however condemning it
may be, humanity will never gain the consciousness to produce a more sustainable
culture. Jimmy, Atwood’s every-human protagonist, remembers his past to stay sane.
Despite the desensitization of his youth, Jimmy remains sentimental about memories of
his mother, his pet racunk, and Oryx and cynical about memories of technology. In
Atwood’s dystopia, Jimmy’s survival is most likely due to his identity as a human and his
refusal to forget.
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Conclusion
In 2007, ecofeminism faces many of the same political challenges with which it
began. Public approval of the Iraq War is at an all time low, and the whereabouts of
foreign nuclear weapons as well as the issue of disposing the waste caused by our own
has resulted in global controversy. However, in its maturity, ecofeminism has also
expanded to include issues of human destruction outside of Western culture. The
“Southern ecofeminists” of the developing economies in Africa and Asia have
contributed a much-needed perspective on the effects of technology and development on
the cultures and environments of indigenous peoples.
Noel Sturgeon explains that the recent ecofeminist focus on the struggles with
technology and environmental destruction of “women of the Third World” has forced
feminists to reexamine the essentializion of these women. She writes that much feminist
discourse “reduces all women in this category to rural village women engaged in
subsistence farming or food gathering” (124). As the scope of ecofeminism expands
outside of Western culture to examine problems of women and oppressed peoples of
Eastern cultures, anti-essentialism will continue to play a large part in the future of
ecofeminist rhetoric.
The “recovery” of ecofeminism’s precursory authors for study within the
movement helps us understand the context of ecofeminism’s roots. Rachel Carson’s
contribution to women’s pursuits in ecology is monumental and her rhetoric on the
connected fates of humanity and nature is echoed in ecofeminism today. The recovery of
ecofeminist works published before the 1974 coining of eco-feminisme plays a similar
role in contextualizing ecofeminism. Ursula K. Le Guin and Margaret Atwood are
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revered ecofeminist authors; however, their works that receive the most ecofeminist
analysis are those published after 1974. By taking an ecofeminist look at Le Guin’s The
Left Hand of Darkness (1969) and The Dispossessed (1974) and Atwood’s Surfacing
(1972), we gain a better understanding of the kind of issues that informed the future of
ecofeminism. Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) gives us perspective on how
ecofeminism has grown since its nascent stages in the early 1970s.
Le Guin’s unwillingness to create sustainable utopias illuminates important
ecofeminist insights into the logic of domination and its stake in human nature. The Left
Hand of Darkness deconstructs concepts of gender, history, and war in order to
conceptualize a departure from the human tradition of dominance. The Dispossessed
continues this philosophy of instinctual dominance. In this novel, Le Guin highlights the
ways that the motivation of ownership and property leads to cultural acceptance of
domination. In both novels, dominance begins as vague hegemony and ends in ostensible
abuse of land and people. By juxtaposing two worlds, Le Guin takes her characters on
introspective journeys during which their critical examination of new cultures leads them
to question the mores of their own.
Atwood’s early perspective on the anti-essentialism debate in ecofeminism as
well as her analysis of technology as a tool for destruction remain major topics in
contemporary ecofeminism. In Surfacing, Atwood gives arguments for both using
identification with nature to break away from male-focused environmental movements
and denying the confining binaries of culture/nature, man/woman. While Atwood
recognizes the merit of both approaches, she ultimately decides that subjugated peoples
cannot reclaim essentialism without falling into the trap of otherization. Written thirty
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years later, Oryx and Crake focuses less on essentialism and more on technology’s affect
on human culture and history. Again, Atwood recognizes both sides of the argument.
Throughout human history technology has been used to save and improve life, and it has
also been used for abuse and environmental destruction. As with Le Guin, Atwood
leaves the responsibility of technology to the constant vigilance of human care.
Ecofeminism argues that the fate of all life is interconnected. As the dominant
life on earth, humans have a special responsibility to uphold an ethic of care that extends
to both human and nonhuman life. Through ecofeminist analyses of Le Guin and
Atwood, this thesis has drawn connections between ecofeminism’s present and past. The
novels examined in this thesis chart the growth and interconnectivity of authors, theories,
and events in ecofeminist history. Le Guin encourages that we continuously rebel against
the tyranny of human dominance while Atwood reminds us that human consciousness
will lead us to the careful development of identity and technology. These lessons help
conceptualize ecofeminist philosophy and produce a more holistic understanding of
where ecofeminism has been and where it is now. Only with this perspective, may we
intuit how ecofeminism will continue to develop and speculate what implications it will
have for the future.
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